Myanmar nationals as Indian citizens: Fueling separatism and ethnic divide in Manipur

The Kuki intellectuals, CSO leaders, and their supporters frequently label the Meitei as secessionists, accusing them of waging war against India. However, historical records tell a different story. Myanmar-origin groups, having settled in Manipur, have also pursued separatist agendas, with organizations like the Chin Liberation Army (CLA) launching armed campaigns in the 1960s to establish a separate Chin state. These efforts, backed by foreign actors, aimed to fracture Manipur from India, revealing a clear secessionist intent that contradicts the narrative pushed by Kuki advocates.

These Kuki and Zo intellectuals have crafted a compelling narrative for the mainstream media, adamantly denying that their communities ever sought separation from India. They portray the Chin-Kuki-Zo people, particularly those under the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement with the Indian government, as peace-loving tribes committed to resolving grievances through dialogue at the negotiating table. This image, very cleverly portrays a marginalized group seeking justice within India’s constitutional framework, devoid of separatist ambitions. Yet, this narrative falters under scrutiny.

A thorough examination of historical movements, the influx of Myanmar nationals posing as Indian citizens, and the orchestrated violence of May 3, 2023, reveals a different reality. Far from being mere seekers of peace, elements within these communities have pursued a separatist agenda since the 1960s, with roots in foreign territories and ties to external actors. Leaders of groups like the Kuki National Army (KNA) and Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA), often Myanmar nationals operating through questionably acquired Indian citizenship, have exploited demographic shifts to fuel ethnic division and separatism. The May 3 violence, misrepresented as a reaction to a High Court order or former CM of Manipur N Biren Singh’ decisions on eviction of encroachers from reserved forest areas and war on drugs, was a deliberate strategy to carve out a separate administration - Zoland or Kukiland - within Manipur, exposing the fragility of the SoO and the audacity of these ambitions.

The separatist aspirations of the Chin-Kuki-Zo communities trace back to the early post-independence period, epitomized by Tunkhopum Baite, a Paite tribal leader born in 1929 in Chin State, Burma. Baite’s family migrated to Manipur in 1930, settling in villages like Hiangtam, Muallum, and later established his own village named Panglian in Churachandpur district. Educated in Imphal, Baite emerged as a prominent tribal leader, associating with various tribal leaders like Rishang Keishing and Yangmaso Shaiza, who became the chief minister of Manipur. His vision was to reunify the Chin tribes—scattered across India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh due to colonial boundaries—into a sovereign entity. In 1960, Baite and other Chin leaders submitted a memorandum to the Indian government demanding reunification, but it was ignored. Frustrated, Baite founded the Chin Liberation Army (CLA), also known as the Chin National Liberation Army (CNLA), on December 23, 1962, with the objective of establishing a sovereign state encompassing parts of Manipur, Mizoram, and Myanmar’s Chin State. This was not a plea for justice within India but a challenge to its sovereignty.

The CLA’s actions were overtly militant. On January 26, 1963, they attacked Sugnu Police Station, hoisting the CLA flag and killing a policeman. The next day, Singngat Police Station was targeted, resulting in another death. Similar attacks occurred in Tengnoupal, Thanlon, and Churachandpur, signaling a coordinated campaign against Indian authorities. Seeking foreign support, Baite traveled to Rangoon and secured a meeting with Pakistan’s President Ayub Khan in Rawalpindi. Pakistan, eager to destabilize India, provided training, arms, and funding, transforming the CLA into a secessionist force. Baite’s cadres, drawn from both India and Myanmar, trained in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), and Baite earned the title “General” from Ayub Khan. The CLA’s alliance with the Mizo National Front (MNF) under Laldenga was initially cooperative but turned fatal. The MNF, pursuing its own separatist agenda in Mizoram, clashed with the CLA over territorial differences. In January 1967, Baite was captured by the MNF, interned, and executed on February 5, 1967. His death marked the CLA’s collapse, but the separatist ideology persisted, resurfacing in later movements like the KNA and ZRA.

A critical factor fueling Manipur’s ethnic divide is the influx of Myanmar nationals, particularly from Chin State, into Manipur. This migration, which began in the 1930s with families like Baite’s, accelerated after Myanmar’s 1962 coup and subsequent political instability. These migrants, often identifying as Chin, Kuki, or Zomi, have settled in Churachandpur, Kangpokpi, and Tengnoupal districts, integrating into tribal politics. However, their loyalties often remain tied to a transnational vision of a unified Chin-Kuki-Zo homeland, a vision rooted in Baite’s era and perpetuated by groups like the KNA and ZRA. The growth of villages in these districts is concerning. Many new settlements, often built on reserved forest land, lack legal recognition and are linked to illegal activities like poppy cultivation. These settlements strain Manipur’s resources and serve as bases for militant activities, with SoO groups reportedly using them to store arms and train cadres.

Detecting Myanmar nationals in Manipur is challenging due to lax border controls and fraudulent identity documentation. The India-Myanmar border, spanning 1,643 km, is porous, and until its scrapping in 2024, the Free Movement Regime (FMR)—allowing visa-free travel up to 16 km—was exploited by migrants. Many Myanmar nationals settled in Manipur and obtained Aadhaar cards, voter IDs, and other documents through lax verification processes. Security operations struggle to identify these individuals due to the lack of a centralized biometric database and coordination between agencies. Myanmar nationals often adopt local names and claim Scheduled Tribe (ST) status, complicating identification. This issue is acute among militant leaders, who leverage Indian citizenship to operate with impunity. The Manipur government’s attempts to conduct biometric surveys in Kuki-Zo areas have faced resistance from CSOs, backed by SoO groups, suggesting an effort to shield undocumented migrants.

The KNA, founded on February 24, 1988, as the armed wing of the Kuki National Organisation (KNO), aims to create “Zalengam,” a separate state encompassing Kuki-inhabited areas in Manipur, Assam, Mizoram, and Myanmar’s Kabaw Valley. Its early cadres trained with the Kachin Independent Army in Myanmar, highlighting cross-border ties. From 1988 to 2013, the KNA engaged in armed confrontations with Myanmar’s military, demonstrating its militant credentials. Post-2010, its Indian and Burmese wings separated, with the latter renamed KNA(B). The KNA’s leadership raises concerns due to its Myanmar origins. Leaders like P.S. Haokip, whose family hails from Myanmar’s Chin State, easily obtained Indian citizenships. The Manipur government’s withdrawal from the SoO with the KNA in March 2023 was based on evidence of its involvement in poppy cultivation and inciting protests against anti-drug policies. The KNA(B)’s resumed fighting in Myanmar post-2021 coup underscores its dual role, contradicting claims of peace within India.

The ZRA, formed in 1997 as the armed wing of the Zomi Re-unification Organisation (ZRO), established in 1993 in Myanmar’s Kachin State, aims to unify Zomi people across India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh into “Zogam” within India. The ZRA emerged amid ethnic tensions in Churachandpur, initially to protect Paite interests but later advocating a broader Zomi identity. Its president, Thanglianpau Guite, hails from Chin State and has political ties to Myanmar. His Indian citizenship is also under scrutiny, as he operates as an ST member while maintaining cross-border activities. The ZRA’s involvement in clashes in Manipur, including the 2023 violence, contradict its peace-loving image. Guite’s leadership exemplifies how Myanmar nationals drive Manipur’s ethnic divide.

The SoO agreement, signed in 2008 with Kuki-Zo militant groups, including the KNA and ZRA, is often cited as evidence of their commitment to peace. However, it has been a strategic pause, allowing groups to regroup, recruit, and engage in illegal activities like extortion and poppy cultivation. The Manipur government’s withdrawal from the SoO with the KNA and ZRA in March 2023 was prompted by their violations, including operating outside camps. Coordinated attacks, arson, and displacement of Meitei from Kuki dominated areas reveal a calculated strategy to destabilize Manipur, with SoO groups like the KNA and ZRA implicated in violating ceasefire terms. The involvement of Myanmar-origin leaders, operating as Indian citizens, further cemented the transnational dimension of this unrest, with their vision of Zoland or Kukiland echoing Baite’s separatist dreams.

From Baite’s CLA to the KNA and ZRA, successive governments have underestimated the threat. The SoO’s lax implementation has emboldened militants, while the failure to detect and deport Myanmar nationals has allowed leaders like Haokip and Guite to operate freely. The growth of unauthorized villages, often linked to these migrants, has provided safe havens for militant activities. The scrapping of the FMR in 2024 is a step forward, but weak enforcement hinders progress. The central government’s reluctance to fully back Manipur’s SoO withdrawal reflects policy incoherence, risking further unrest.

Even though the Indian government is fully aware of the separatist intentions of certain Kuki-Zo leaders from Myanmar, earlier response to Chin-Kuki-Zo separatism has been inadequate. This time, Union Home Minister Amit Shah has firmly rejected their demand for a separate administration. While it is evident that such a demand will not be granted, it is equally important to ensure that the Meitei community is not deprived of their ancestral lands and rights in an effort to appease others. The government must strengthen SoO oversight, verify citizenship, enhance border security, and address legitimate grievances through development. Only by confronting this agenda can India secure peace in Manipur and uphold its sovereignty.